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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 We are asked to decide whether a false statement in a 
communication from a debt collector to a debtor must be 
material in order to be actionable under a provision of the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 
1692e.  We conclude that materiality is required, as it is 
subsumed within the “least sophisticated debtor” standard that 
has traditionally governed FDCPA claims.  Because we do 
not find the misstatement at issue in this case material, we 
will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 
Pressler & Pressler and Midland Funding, LLC.   
I. 
 
 The facts of this case are largely undisputed.  
Appellant Paula Jensen defaulted on a Bank of America credit 
card, and her debt was eventually sold to Appellee Midland 
Funding, LLC (“Midland”).  Midland retained the law firm of 
Appellee Pressler & Pressler (“Pressler”) to help collect 
Jensen’s debt.  Midland obtained a default judgment against 
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Jensen in the Superior Court of New Jersey in the amount of 
$5,965.82.  Pressler then attempted to collect on that 
judgment by serving an information subpoena and written 
questions on Jensen. 
  
 The information subpoena and accompanying 
questions sought personal and financial information from 
Jensen in aid of collection.  It advised that “failure to comply 
. . . may result in . . . arrest and incarceration.”  The 
information subpoena was issued pursuant to Rule 1:9-1 of 
the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey 
(“New Jersey Rules”), which allows New Jersey attorneys to 
issue subpoenas in the name of the clerk of court.  
Information subpoenas issued under this rule properly bear 
the signature of the clerk, even though the clerk herself did 
not sign the subpoena and likely does not even have 
knowledge of it.  The information subpoena here was based 
on the sample “form” in the Appendix to the New Jersey 
Rules.  That form provides space for two electronic or typed 
signatures: one for the issuing attorney, and one for the clerk.  
Because Pressler sought to enforce a judgment from the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, the Superior Court clerk’s 
name should have appeared on the clerk’s signature line. 
  
 Instead, Pressler listed “Terrence D. Lee” on the 
clerk’s signature line.  Lee had never worked as a clerk of the 
Superior Court, and although he had been the County Clerk of 
Warren County, he left that position six years earlier.  
Ironically, Jensen knew Lee, and she also knew that he was 
not a clerk of the Superior Court.  Roughly one month later, 
Jensen sent a letter to Pressler explaining that she was aware 
that Mr. Lee was not the Superior Court clerk and calling the 
subpoena “fraudulent.”  However, she also answered the 
questions that accompanied the information subpoena.  
 Thereafter, Jensen moved to vacate the state court 
judgment against her, but her motion was denied.  She then 
filed a putative class action against Pressler and Midland 
(together, “Appellees” or “Collectors”) in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging a violation of § 
1692e of the FDCPA, which prohibits making false, 
misleading, or deceptive statements in the collection of 
consumer debts.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Collectors and denied Jensen’s cross 
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motion for summary judgment.  It concluded that, because the 
misuse of Lee’s name was not a material false statement, 
there could be no liability under § 1692e.  See Jensen v. 
Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 13-CV-01712, 2014 WL 
1745042, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014).  This appeal 
followed.1 
  
 We have not yet had occasion to decide whether § 
1692e contains a materiality requirement.  For the reasons 
that follow, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that 
misstatements must be material to be actionable under § 




 “This Court exercises plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same 
standard employed by the district court.”  Trinity Indus., Inc. 
v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Summary judgment should only be granted where, after the 
close of discovery and viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, the movant establishes 
that no genuine issue of material fact remains.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  “A 
factual dispute is material if it might affect the outcome of the 
suit under governing law.”  Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 
761 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Doe v. Luzerne 
Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
 
III. 
 “To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt 
collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an 
attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the 
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in 
attempting to collect the debt.”  Douglass v. Convergent 
Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014).  Only the 
fourth prong is disputed here.  As noted, Jensen asserts that 
the subpoena violated § 1692e, the provision of the law 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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dealing with communications from debt collectors to debtors.  
She also claims that the subpoena violated two more specific 
subsections, § 1692e(9) and § 1692e(10).  Those provisions 
provide: 
 
A debt collector may not use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or 
means in connection with the collection of any 
debt. Without limiting the general application of 
the foregoing, the following conduct is a 
violation of this section: 
 
* * *  
(9) The use or distribution of any written 
communication which simulates or is 
falsely represented to be a document 
authorized, issued, or approved by any 
court, official, or agency of the United 
States or any State, or which creates a 
false impression as to its source, 
authorization, or approval. 
 
(10) The use of any false representation or 
deceptive means to collect or attempt to 
collect any debt or to obtain information 
concerning a consumer. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  Jensen argues that Pressler’s use of 
Terrence Lee’s electronic signature was a “false . . . 
representation” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  Jensen is 
obviously correct as a factual matter, insofar as using 
Terrence Lee’s name is a “false representation” in the most 
technical sense of the phrase.  The subpoena represents Lee to 
be the Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey, but he was 
not the clerk and had never held that post.   
  
 However, Appellees argue that this technically false 
representation is not actionable under the FDCPA because it 
is not material.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
first addressed this issue in Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships 
LLC, 557 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2009).  There, the court adopted 
a “materiality” requirement for false, misleading, or deceptive 
statements under the FDCPA.  Id. at 757.  A number of our 
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sister Courts of Appeals subsequently adopted such a 
requirement.  See Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank, 780 F.3d 227, 
234 (4th Cir. 2015); Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 
1027, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2010); Miller v. Javitch, Block & 
Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2009).  No Circuit 
Court that has addressed this issue has disagreed with Hahn 
and held that an immaterial false statement made during the 
collection of a consumer debt is actionable under the FDCPA.  
This dispute presents our Court with its first opportunity to 
decide if “false, deceptive, or misleading” statements must be 
material to be actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.2    
 
Jensen correctly argues that the word “material” does 
not appear in the statute.  However, that is not necessarily 
outcome determinative.  Congress’s intent guides our 
interpretation of statutes.  See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle 
Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011).  Our 
interpretive task begins and ends with the text of the statute 
unless the text is ambiguous or does not reveal congressional 
intent “with sufficient precision” to resolve our inquiry.  Id.  
However, “[w]here the statutory language does not express 
Congress’s intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to 
the legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute 
was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional 
purpose.”  In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 
248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  Jensen’s reliance 
on the precise wording of the statute here ignores the fact that 
materiality requirement is simply a corollary of the well-
established “least sophisticated debtor” standard, which 
courts have routinely applied to alleged violations of § 1692e 
                                              
2 The sub-parts of § 1692e comprise a non-exhaustive list of 
debt collection practices that violate the prohibition on false 
or misleading representation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 
(“Without limiting the general application of the foregoing 
[general prohibition on false, deceptive or misleading 
representations], the following conduct is a violation of this 
section . . . .”).  Most of the examples of prohibited behavior 
involve a statement or affirmative representation by a debt 
collector, but § 1692e(11) involves an omission: the failure to 
disclose relevant information.  When we refer to § 1692e’s 
prohibition of some statements or representations, we refer to 
all acts and omissions covered under the provision.  
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in order to advance the congressional intent of the FDCPA.  
Indeed, the parties do not dispute this standard’s validity and 
application to this case.  Yet, that standard, like the disputed 
materiality requirement, appears nowhere in the text of the 
statute.  As we will explain, we are satisfied that both the 
least sophisticated debtor standard and the materiality 
requirement supply a necessary analytical framework and are 
consistent with the FDCPA’s purpose and legislative history.  
Because we agree with the District Court that the Collectors 




 As the FDCPA is an explicitly remedial statute, passed 
by Congress “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices 
by debt collectors,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), “we construe its 
language broadly, so as to effect its purpose[,]” Brown v. 
Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted).  Courts routinely employ a “least sophisticated 
debtor” standard when deciding if debt collection violates the 
FDCPA.  See Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“We use the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ 
standard in order to effectuate ‘the basic purpose of the 
FDCPA . . . .’” (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 454)).  Although 
the least sophisticated debtor standard is “lower than the 
standard of a reasonable debtor,” it “preserv[es] a quotient of 
reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding 
and willingness to read with care.”  Id. (quoting Wilson v. 
Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354–55 (3d Cir. 2000)).  In 
so doing, it “give[s] effect to the Act’s intent to ‘protect[] the 
gullible as well as the shrewd.’”  Campuzano-Burgos v. 
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 
453).   
 
 The standard is an objective one, meaning that the 
specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually 
confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated 
debtor would be.  See Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. 
Spaulding, 766 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he FDCPA 
does not require that a plaintiff actually be confused.”); 
Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (“We apply an objective test based on the 
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understanding of the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ in 
determining whether a collection letter violates section 
1692e.”).  Thus, “the FDCPA enlists the efforts of 
sophisticated consumers . . . as ‘private attorneys general’ to 
aid their less sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely 
themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed 
by the Act to benefit from the deterrent effect of civil actions 
brought by others.”  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 
516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 
 As noted earlier, the phrase “least sophisticated 
debtor” does not appear in the text of the FDCPA.  
Nevertheless, the standard is almost universally employed by 
Courts of Appeals in interpreting that law.3  Indeed, the 
standard was first used more than three decades ago in 1981, 
a mere four years after the FDCPA was enacted.  Bingham v. 
Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 870-71 (D.N.D. 
1981) (explaining that the standard historically used to 
analyze Federal Trade Commission Act claims, that courts 
“should look not to the most sophisticated readers but to the 
least[,]” should also be used in the FDCPA context (quoting 
                                              
3 The overwhelming majority of Courts of Appeals have 
employed some form of the standard, though it is sometimes 
referred to as the “least sophisticated consumer” or 
“unsophisticated debtor” standard.  See Pollard, 766 F.3d at 
103; McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 (5th 
Cir. 2012); Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 
643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2009); Strand v. Diversified Collection 
Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004); Terran v. 
Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Nat’l Fin. Serv., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 
1996); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 
1993); Smith v. Transworld Sys., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028–30 
(6th Cir. 1992); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 
(11th Cir. 1985).  The Tenth Circuit appears to have never 
explicitly embraced—but certainly never disclaimed—the 
standard.  See Dikeman v. Nat’l Educators, Inc., 81 F.3d 949, 
954 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the [FDCPA] is . . . 
designed to protect such consumers as may not have the 
sophistication to appreciate the significance of debt collection 
communications”).  The D.C. Circuit has apparently not had 
occasion to decide the issue. 
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Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 
1961)).  The first Court of Appeals to adopt this standard did 
so a year later, in 1982.  See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 
F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
given a thorough and a compelling explanation of why the 
reasonable person standard is not appropriate under the 
FDCPA.  See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 
(11th Cir. 1985).  As Jeter explains, prior to the passage of 
the FDCPA, the least sophisticated debtor standard was used 
to analyze claims that deceptive debt collection practices 
violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).  Id. at 
1173.  At that time, regulations issued by the Federal Trade 
Commission under the authority of the FTCA banned 
deceptive practices.  See id.  However, in enacting the 
FDCPA, Congress explicitly found that “[e]xisting laws and 
procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to 
protect consumers.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).  Thus, the Jeter 
court reasoned, “[i]t would be anomalous for the Congress, in 
light of its belief that existing state and federal law was 
inadequate to protect consumers, to have intended that the 
legal standard under the FDCPA be less protective of 
consumers than under the existing ‘inadequate’ legislation.”  
Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1173–74. 
 
 Based on its legislative history, the context of its 
passage, and its statutory purpose, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that Congress intended courts to view FDCPA 
claims from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.  
Id. at 1175.  The court reasoned that “the FDCPA’s purpose 
of protecting [consumers] . . . is best served by a definition of 
‘deceive’ that looks to the tendency of language to mislead 
the least sophisticated recipients of a debt collector’s 
[communications].”  Id. (second alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)).  As noted, the Courts of Appeals have 
nearly universally embraced Jeter’s reasoning and employed 
the least sophisticated debtor standard to help effectuate the 






 We regularly apply the least sophisticated debtor 
standard to claims under § 1692e.  Specifically, we focus on 
whether a debt collector’s statement in a communication to a 
debtor would deceive or mislead the least sophisticated 
debtor.  See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, 
LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 487 (2014) (explaining that the debtor collector is 
“responsible for [a communication’s] content and for what 
the least sophisticated debtor would have understood from 
it”); Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 223 (determining whether a letter 
was deceptive by asking “whether under the least 
sophisticated debtor standard, [the debt collector’s] letter to 
[the debtor] ‘can be reasonably read to have two different 
meanings, one of which is inaccurate’” (quoting Quadramed, 
225 F.3d at 354)).   
 
 As quoted earlier, § 1692e prohibits the use of any 
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt.”  While it is 
impossible to know whether a statement is misleading or 
deceptive without reference to the person being misled or 
deceived—here, the least sophisticated debtor—the same is 
not true of falsity; a statement is either true or false.  This 
presented a challenge to courts trying to view false statements 
through the eyes of the least sophisticated debtor.  For 
example, in Wahl Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643 
(7th Cir. 2009), the court was asked to determine if Congress 
intended false communications to be treated differently than 
misleading or deceptive communications under the FDCPA.  
That court’s explanation for uniformly analyzing the three 
categories of statements laid the foundation for a materiality 
requirement:  
Where a plaintiff alleges that a collection 
statement is false (rather than deceptive or 
misleading), Wahl contends, the only 
determination for the court is whether the 
statement is in fact false. “It is unnecessary to 
determine whether the unsophisticated 
consumer would be deceived or misled or 
confused by the alleged false statement.” That 




In deciding whether collection letters violate the 
FDCPA, we have consistently viewed them 
through the eyes of the “unsophisticated 
consumer.” 
 
Id. at 645.  The Wahl court stressed that the state of mind of 
the debtor is always relevant, and that debt collection 
communications must be assessed from the perspective of the 
least sophisticated debtor regardless of whether a 
communication is alleged to be false, misleading, or 
deceptive.  See id. at 645–46.   
 
 In Hahn, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
simply expanded on Wahl’s reasoning.  The court explained 
that materiality “is the upshot of [the] conclusion in Wahl 
that, ‘[i]f a statement would not mislead the unsophisticated 
consumer, it does not violate the [Act]—even if it is false in 
some technical sense.’”  Hahn, 557 F.3d at 758 (second and 
third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Wahl, 
556 F.3d at 646).  The Hahn court recognized that the 
FDCPA was designed to give debtors reliable information so 
that they can make informed decisions about how to address 
debts, and that “by definition immaterial information neither 
contributes to that objective (if the statement is correct) nor 
undermines it (if the statement is incorrect).”  Id. at 757–58.  
Accordingly, a false statement is only actionable under the 
FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making 
process of the least sophisticated debtor; in other words, it 
must be material when viewed through the least sophisticated 
debtor’s eyes. 
 
 It is therefore clear that the materiality requirement is 
simply another way of phrasing the legal standard we already 
employ when analyzing claims under § 1692e, so that the 
same analysis can be applied to communications containing 
false statements.  See Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1034 (“[T]he 
materiality requirement functions as a corollary inquiry into 
whether a statement is likely to mislead an unsophisticated 
consumer.”).  Because we view the materiality requirement as 
a different way of expressing the least sophisticated debtor 
standard, we are satisfied that adopting a materiality 
requirement for claims brought under § 1692e is consistent 
with Congress’s intent in this regard.  Indeed, refusing to 
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adopt this materiality requirement would be inconsistent with 
decades of our own jurisprudence employing the least 
sophisticated debtor standard.   
 
 We realize, as we noted earlier, that the FDCPA is a 
remedial statute designed to curb abusive collective practices, 
and that it must therefore be read liberally.  However, our 
recognition that an element of materiality is subsumed in our 
analytical framework does nothing to dilute the protection 
Congress intended.  A debtor simply cannot be confused, 





 We stress that this materiality standard does not turn 
on what an ordinary individual might reasonably understand 
from a debt collector’s communication.  See United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (defining a material 
statement as one that has “a natural tendency to influence, or 
[is] capable of influencing, the decision of the 
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed” (quoting 
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)).  Because 
the materiality requirement is a corollary of the least 
sophisticated debtor standard, the relevant “decisionmaking 
body” here is the least sophisticated debtor.  Thus, a 
statement in a communication is material if it is capable of 
influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor.  See 
Elyazidi, 780 F.3d at 234 (“To violate the statute, a 
representation must be material, which is to say, it must be 
‘important in the sense that [it] could objectively affect the 
least sophisticated consumer’s decisionmaking.’” (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted)). 
 As our jurisprudence in this area has shown, this is not 
a particularly high bar.  For example, we recently held that 
debt collectors may not, consistent with § 1692e, represent 
estimates of the amount that the debtor would ultimately owe 
as the actual amount owed as of the date of the 
communication.  McLaughlin, 756 F.3d at 246; see also 
Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A., 783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 
2015).  In McLaughlin, we noted that the conduct plainly 
violated § 1692e(2), which forbids the “false representation of 
. . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.”  756 
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F.3d at 246.  Thus, the materiality requirement, correctly 
applied, effectuates the purpose of the FDCPA by precluding 
only claims based on hypertechnical misstatements under § 
1692e that would not affect the actions of even the least 
sophisticated debtor.  See Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 221 (noting 
that the least sophisticated debtor standard “prevents liability 
for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection 




 It is therefore obvious that the inclusion of Lee’s name 
itself on the information subpoena here is simply not material.  
It could not possibly have affected the least sophisticated 
debtor’s “ability to make intelligent decisions.”  Donohue, 
592 F.3d at 1034.4  Thus, the subpoena is not a 
communication that violates the prohibitions on false 
statements or representations in § 1692e or § 1692e(10). 
 
 Perhaps it is not surprising, given our discussion, that 
one of Jensen’s main arguments is that the inclusion of an 
incorrect signature on the subpoena rendered it invalid in 
violation of § 1629e(9).  Specifically, she argues that the 
subpoena falsely represented itself to be a valid legal 
document, when in fact it was an invalid legal document.  
Section 1629e(9) prohibits “[t]he use or distribution of any 
written communication which simulates or is falsely 
represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved 
by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any 
State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, 
authorization, or approval.”  This argument is also without 
merit. 
 
 The information subpoena is not “falsely represented 
to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court 
                                              
4 The Collectors urge us to look not to a purely objective 
standard, but rather to look to what an objective debtor in 
Jensen’s situation, who (like Jensen) knew that Lee was not 
the proper clerk, would have thought or done.  We need not 
consider whether this is a proper framing of the least 
objective debtor standard, because the error still would not 
have been material under either scenario.   
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[or] official.”  Id.  Under the New Jersey Rules, the clerk’s 
signature does not verify that the clerk has seen or even knew 
about the document.  Rather, under New Jersey practice, 
“[t]he preparation and sealing of a summons and most other 
writs is the duty of the attorney issuing the writ, who is, for 
that purpose, considered as the agent of the clerk of the 
court.”  Stanley v. Great Gorge Country Club, 803 A.2d 181, 
190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (quoting GEORGE S. 
HARRIS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN NEW JERSEY 37–38 
(Rev. Ed. 1939)) (emphasis omitted); see also N.J. Ct. R. 1:9-
1. 
 
 We are not persuaded that the information subpoena 
bearing Lee’s name is actually invalid under New Jersey law.  
Though the issue does not appear to be frequently litigated, 
particularly in modern times, New Jersey courts have 
repeatedly declined to invalidate similar documents based on 
hypertechnical errors.  See Stanley, 803 A.2d at 190 (“A 
summons is not void notwithstanding irregularities in 
omitting date, seal, and clerk’s signature, or the attorney’s 
address.” (quoting HARRIS, supra, at 37–38)).   
 
 In Hirsch et al. v. De Puy, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court was faced with a “summons [that] was not dated, . . .  
carried no seal, and . . . although the name and title of the 
clerk were typed in the space usually occupied by the 
signature, there was no actual signature.”  166 A. 720, 721 
(N.J. 1933) (per curiam).  The court noted that each of these 
errors violated state procedural rules, and it acknowledged 
that “there must be a point at which the accumulation of 
irregularities in a paper that assumes to be a writ deprives that 
instrument of authenticity.”  Id.  However, in part because the 
intended recipient would know “with certainty that [the 
summons] is a court process,” the court held that the 
summons was not void.  Id.  Certainly the information 
subpoena in this case was less error-ridden than the one at 
issue in Hirsch.  Thus, it is inconceivable that the single small 
error here somehow made the information subpoena invalid. 
 
 Moreover, where the state courts have remarked on the 
importance of compliance with technical requirements, the 
mistake at issue had the capacity to prejudice one of the 
parties.  For example, Jensen cites to Cavallaro v. Jamco 
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Property Management, where the court noted that “the 
subpoena power is a significant one which must be exercised 
in good faith and in strict adherence to the rules to eliminate 
potential abuses.”  760 A.2d 353, 359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2000).  However, there, a plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to 
include the defense attorney in communications with a 
deponent resulted in the disclosure of privileged materials.  
See id.; see also Crescenzo v. Crane, 796 A.2d 283, 284 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“An attorney failed to comply 
with the provisions of the [New Jersey subpoena] Rule, and a 
doctor, improperly responding to a discovery subpoena, 
forwarded privileged records of his patient without notice or 
authorization.”).  There is no basis for this Court to conclude 
that this subpoena is actually invalid under state law.  
Therefore, Jensen’s argument that the error is material 
because it misrepresents the nature of the subpoena, or that 
Collectors violated § 1629e(9) by mailing her an invalid 
subpoena, must fail.   
 
 Jensen’s remaining arguments are similarly unavailing.  
Jensen tries to rely on a thread of federal case law holding 
that, in some situations, actions taken by attorneys as debt 
collectors are subject to more intense scrutiny than the acts of 
ordinary debt collectors.  See Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 
301 (“Under the [FDCPA], attorney debt collectors warrant 
closer scrutiny because their abusive collection practices ‘are 
more egregious than those of lay collectors.’” (quoting 
Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
This reliance is misplaced, as these cases arise out of 
situations where attorneys improperly use their status as 
attorneys to pressure or coerce debtors.  See id.; see also 
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that the use of a lawyer’s name and signature on 
mass mailings in that case gave “the impression that the 
letters were communications from an attorney” although the 
letters “were not ‘from’ [the attorney] in any meaningful 
sense of that word”).  The Pressler attorney who signed the 
information subpoena in this case was not using her status to 
wrongly imply that legal action may be taken.  She was 
merely issuing a valid subpoena under New Jersey Rules.   
 
 Finally, we are unmoved by Jensen’s argument that 
summary judgment was improper because materiality is a 
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mixed question of fact and law that must be presented to a 
jury.5  Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record 
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 
for the non-moving party.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  No 
reasonable juror could find that the mistake in this case was 
material.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant 




 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court.  
                                              
5 We have noted that whether contradictory language in a 
notice would “confuse or mislead the ‘least sophisticated 
debtor’ as to his statutory rights under the [FDCPA] to 
validate and dispute the debt” is a question of law.  
Quadramed, 225 F.3d at 353 n.2.  However, we recognize 
that at least one Court of Appeals has remarked that 
“materiality is a mixed question of law and fact” and 
explained that “often ‘whether a letter is misleading raises a 
question of fact.’”  Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, 
No. 14-3836, 2015 WL 2151755, at *14 (6th Cir. May 8, 
2015).  Though the parties dispute whether materiality is a 
question of fact or law, we need not decide the issue, as the 
Collectors would be entitled to summary judgment under 
either standard. 
